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Abstract
We introduce Mean Field Markov games with N players, in which each
individual in a large population interacts with other randomly selected
players. The states and actions of each player in an interaction together
determine the instantaneous payoff for all involved players. They also
determine the transition probabilities to move to the next state. Each
individual wishes to maximize the total expected discounted payoff over
an infinite horizon. We provide a rigorous derivation of the asymptotic
behavior of this system as the size of the population grows to infinity.
Under indistinguishability per type assumption, we show that under any
Markov strategy, the random process consisting of one specific player and
the remaining population converges weakly to a jump process driven by
the solution of a system of differential equations. We characterize the
solutions to the team and to the game problems at the limit of infinite
population and use these to construct near optimal strategies for the case
of a finite, but large, number of players. We show that the large population
asymptotic of the microscopic model is equivalent to a (macroscopic) mean
field stochastic game in which a local interaction is described by a single
player against a population profile (the mean field limit). We illustrate
our model to derive the equations for a dynamic evolutionary Hawk and
Dove game with energy level.
1 Introduction
We consider a large population of players in which frequent interactions occur
between small numbers of chosen individuals. Each interaction in which a player
is involved can be described as one stage of a dynamic game. The state and
actions of the players at each stage determine an immediate payoff (also called
∗This work was partially supported by the INRIA ARC Program: Populations, Game
Theory, and Evolution (POPEYE) and by an EPFL PhD internship grant.
†This paper has been presented at the first international conference on Game Theory for
Networks, Gamenets 2009, Istanbul, Turkey, [2].
fitness in behavioral ecology) for each player as well as the transition proba-
bilities of a controlled Markov chain associated with each player. Each player
wishes to maximize its expected fitness averaged over time.
This model extends the basic evolutionary games by introducing a controlled
state that characterizes each player. The stochastic dynamic games at each
interaction replace the matrix games, and the objective of maximizing the ex-
pected long-term payoff over an infinite time horizon replaces the objective of
maximizing the outcome of a matrix game. Instead of a choice of a (possibly
mixed) action, a player is now faced with the choice of decision rules (called
strategies) that determine what actions should be chosen at a given interaction
for given present and past observations.
This model with a finite number of players, called a mean field interaction
model, is in general difficult to analyze because of the huge state space required
to describe the sate of all players. Then, taking the asymptotics as the number
of players grows to infinity, the whole behavior of the population is replaced by
a deterministic limit that represents the system’s state, which is fraction of the
population at each individual state that use a given action.
In this paper we study the asymptotic dynamic behavior of the system in
which the population profile evolves in time. For large N, under mild assump-
tions (see Section 3), the mean field converges to a deterministic measure that
satisfies a non-linear ordinary differential equation for under any stationary
strategy. We show that the mean field interaction is asymptotically equivalent
to a Markov decision evolutionary game. When the rest of the population uses
a fixed strategy u, any given player sees an equivalent game against a collective
of players whose state evolves according to the ordinary differential equation
(ODE) which we explicitly compute. In addition to providing the exact limiting
asymptotic, the ODE approach provides tight approximations for fixed large N.
The mean field asymptotic calculations for largeN for given choices of strategies
allows us to compute the equilibrium of the game in the asymptotic regime.
1.1 Related Work
Mean field interaction models have already been used in standard evolutionary
games in a completely different context: that of evolutionary game dynamics
(such as replicator dynamics) see e.g. [11] and references therein. The paradigm
there has been to associate relative growth rate to actions according to the fitness
they achieved, then study the asymptotic trajectories of the state of the system,
i.e. the fraction of users that adopt the different actions. Non-atomic Markov
Decision Games have been studied in [1] and applied in [12] to firm idiosyncratic
random shocks using decentralized strategies. They proposed the notion of
oblivious equilibria via a mean field approximation. Extension to unbounded
cost function can be found in [3]. Applications to cellular communications can
found in [4].
Most of these approaches considered the case where the payoff of a player
depends on the states of the other players but not explicitly on the actions of the
others. In this paper, the payoff depends explicitly on both states and actions
of the other players.
1.2 Structure
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In next section we present
the model assumptions and notations. In Section 3 we present some convergence
results of the ODE in the random number of interacting players. In Section 4 a
resource competition between animals with two types of behaviors and several
states is presented. All the sketch of proofs are given in Appendix. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Model description
2.1 Mean Field Markov Process With N Players
We consider the following model, which we call Mean Field Markov Game with
N players.
• There are N ∈ N players.
• Each player has its own state. A state has two components: the type of
the player and the internal state. The type is a constant during the game. The
state of player j at time t is denoted by XNj (t) = (θj , S
N
j (t)) where θj is the
type. The set of possible states X = {1, . . . ,Θ} × S is finite.
• Time is discrete, taking values in NN := {0,
1
N ,
2
N , . . .}.
• The global detailed description of the system at time t isXN(t) = (XN1 (t), . . . , X
N
N (t)).
DefineMN (t) to be the current population profile i.eMNx (t) =
1
N
∑N
j=1 1{XNj (t)=x}.
At each time t, MN(t) is in the finite set {0, 1N ,
2
N , . . . , 1}
♯X , and MNθ,s(t) is the
fraction of players who belong to population of type θ (also called subpopula-
tion θ) and have internal state s. Also let M¯Nθ = N
∑N
s∈SM
N
θ,s(t) be the size of
subpopulation θ (independent of t by hypothesis). We do not make any specific
hypothesis on the ratios
M¯Nθ
N as N gets large (it may be constant or not, it may
tend to 0 or not).
• Strategies and local interaction: At time slot t, an ordered list BN(t),
of players in {1, 2, . . . , N}, without repetition, is selected randomly as follows.
First we draw a random number of players K(t) such that
P(K(t) = k|MN(t) = ~m) = JNk (~m)
where the distribution JNk (~m) is given for any N , ~m ∈ {0,
1
N ,
2
N , . . . , 1}
♯X .
Second, we set BN to an ordered list of K(t) players drawn uniformly at random
among the N(N − 1)...(N −K(t) + 1) possible ones. By abuse of notation we
write j ∈ BN(t) with the meaning that j appears in the list BN(t).
Each player such that j ∈ BN(t) takes part in a one-shot event at time t, as
follows. First, the player chooses an action a in the finite set A with probability
uθ(a|s) where (θ, s) is the current player state. The stochastic array u is the
strategy profile of the population, and uθ is the strategy of subpopulation θ.
A vector of probability distributions u which depend only on the type of the
player and its internal state is called stationary strategy.
Second, say that BN(t) = (j1, . . . , jk). Given the actions aj1 , ..., ajk drawn by
the k players, we draw a new set of internal states (s′j1 , ..., s
′
jk
) with probability
LNθ;s;a;s′(k, ~m),
where θ = (θj1 , ..., θjk), s = (sj1 , ..., sjk)
a = (aj1 , ..., ajk), s
′ = (s′j1 , ..., s
′
jk
)
Then the collection of k players makes one synchronized transition, such that
SNji (t+
1
N
) = s′ji i = 1, . . . , k
Note that SNj (t+
1
N ) = S
N
j (t) if j is not in B
N(t).
It can easily be shown that this form of interaction has following properties:
(1) XN is Markov and (2) players can be observed only through their state.
The model is entirely specified by the probability distributions JN , the
Markov transition kernels LN and the strategy profile u. In this paper, we
assume that JN and LN are fixed for all N , but u can be changed and does
not depend on N (though it would be trivial to extend our results to strategies
that depend on N , but this appears to be unnecessary complication). We are
interested in large N .
It follows from our assumptions that
1. MN (t) is Markov.
2. for any fixed j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (XNj (t),M
N (t)) is Markov. This means that
the evolution of one specific player XNj (t) depends on the other players
only through the occupancy measure MN(t).
2.2 Payoffs
We consider two types of instantaneous payoff and one discounted payoff:
• Instant Gain: This is the random gain GNj (t) obtained by one player
whenever it is involved in an event at time t. We assume that it depends on this
player’s state just before the event and just after the event, the chosen action,
and on the states and actions of all players involved in this event. Formally, if
player j ∈ BN(t)
GNj (t) = g
N (xj , aj, x
′
j , xBN (t)\j , aBN (t)\j , x
′
BN (t)\j)
where xj = X
N
j (t), aj is the action chosen by player j, x
′
j = X
N
j (t+
1
N ), xBN (t)\j
[resp. x′BN (t)\j ] is the list of states at time t [resp. at time t +
1
N ] of players
other than j involved in the event, aBN (t)\j is the list of their actions and g() is
some non random function defined on the set of appropriate lists. Whenever j
is not in BN(t), GNj (t) = 0. We assume that G
N
j (t) is bounded, i.e. there is a
non random number C0 such that, with probability 1: for all j, t: |G
N
j (t)| ≤ C0
• Expected Instant Payoff: It is defined as the expected instant gain of player
j, given the state x of j and the population profile ~m. By our indistinguishability
assumption, it does not depend on the identity of a player, so we can write it as
rN (u, x, ~m) := E
(
GNj (t)
∣∣XNj (t) = x,MN (t) = ~m)
Note that this conditional expectation contains the case when j is not in BN(t),
i.e. when GNj (t) = 0.
• Discounted Long-Term Payoff: It is defined as the expected discounted
long term payoff of one player, given the initial state of this player and the
population: r¯N (u;x, ~m) :=
E(
∞∑
t=0 step 1/N
e−βtGNj (t)|Xj(0) = x,M
N (0) = ~m)
where β is a positive parameter (existence follows from the boundedness of
GNj ). The fact that it does not depend on the identity j of the player, but
only on its initial state x and the initial population profile ~m, follows from the
indistinguishability assumption.
We defined the Discounted Long-Term Payoff in terms of the instant gain,
as this is the most natural definition. The following proposition shows that the
alternative definition, by means of the expected instant payoff, is equivalent.
Proposition 2.2.1. For all player state x and population profile ~m
r¯N (u;x, ~m) = E(
∞∑
t=0 step 1/N
e−βtrN (u,XNj (t),
~MN (t))
|Xj(0) = x,M
N(0) = ~m)
2.3 Focus on One Single Player
We are interested in the following special case (here we make the dependency
on the strategy explicit). There are two types of players, i.e. Θ = 2. There is
exactly one player (the player of interest) with type 1. All other players have
type 2. In this case we use the notation RN (u1, u2; s, ~m) for the discounted
long-term payoff obtained by the player in type 0, when her strategy is u1 and
all other players’s strategy is u2, given that this player’s initial internal state is
s and the initial type 2 subpopulation profile is ~m. Note that
RN (u1, u2; s, ~m) = r¯
N (u1, u2; (1, s), ~m
′)
with m′1,s′ =
1
N 1s=s′ and m
′
2,s′ = m2,s′ for all s
′ ∈ S.
Mean Field Markov Game
Player j may choose a strategy uj which laws depends on its type and its own-
internal state. We look for a (Nash) equilibrium u such that if all players use
u then no player has an incentive to deviate from u. For any finite N one can
map this into a standard Markov game. This is true for both the case where the
number of players is known and in the case it is unknown when taking a decision.
Therefore we know that a stationary equilibrium exists in the discounted case.
A stationary equilibrium is solution of the fixed point equation:
∀j, uj,θ ∈ argmax
vj,θ
RN (vj,θ, u−j; s,m)
By assuming indistinguishability per type we can show that a stationary equi-
librium exists which is a solution of the fixed point equation
∀θ, uθ ∈ argmax
vθ
RN (vθ, u; s,m)
Note that the mean field optimality here refers to the maximization of
Rn(u, u, s,m) over symmetric and stationary strategies. It is not necessarily
optimal in the global sense.
Mean Field Markov Team
We wish to find a stationary u that maximizes RN averaged over all players.
u = (u1, . . . , uΘ) ∈ argmax
v
RN (v; s,m)
3 Main Results
3.1 Scaling Assumptions
We are interested in the large N regime and obtain that, for any fixed j,
(XNj ,M
N ) converges weakly to a simple process. This requires the weak con-
vergence of MN (0) to some ~m0.
We assume that the parameters of the model and the payoff per time unit
converge as N →∞, i.e.

JNk (~m)→ Jk(~m)
LNθ;s;a;s′(k, ~m)→ Lθ;s;a;s′(k, ~m)
rN (u, x, ~m)→ r(u, x, ~m)
(1)
Our main scaling assumption is
H1
∑
k k
2Jk(~m) <∞ for all ~m ∈ ∆. This ensures that the second moment of
the number of players involved in an event per time slot is bounded.
Note that H1 excludes the case where the number of players involved in an
event per time slot scales like N (i.e. synchronous transitions of all players at
the same time). There may be large N asymptotic results for such cases [13]
but the limit is not given by an ODE. In contrast, H1 is automatically true if
the number of players involved in an event per time slot is upper bounded by
a non random constant. We also need some technical assumptions, which are
usually true and can be verified by inspection.
H2
∑
k Jk(~m) > 0 for all ~m ∈ ∆ (∆ is the simplex {~m : mθ,s ≥ 0,
∑
θ,smθ,s =
1}). This ensures that the mean number of players involved in an event
per time slot,
∑
k≥0 kJk(~m) is non zero.
Define the drift of MN (t) as
~fN (u, ~m) = E
(
MN(t+
1
N
)−MN (t)|MN (t) = ~m
)
Note that we make explicit the dependency on the strategy u but not on J and
L, assumed to be fixed.
It follows from our hypotheses that
lim
N→∞
NfN(u, ~m) := f(u, ~m) (2)
exists.
H3 We assume that the convergence in Equation (2) is uniform in ~m and the
limit is Lipschitz-continuous in ~m. This is in particular true if one can
write, for every strategy u, fN (u, ~m) = 1N φu(
1
N , ~m), with φu defined on
[0, ǫ]×∆ where ǫ > 0 and Φu is continuously differentiable.
H4 P(XNj (t+1/N) = y|X
N
j (t) = x,M
N (t) = m,MN(t+1/N) = m′) converges
uniformly in ~m, ~m′ and the limit is Lipschitz-continuous in ~m, ~m′. This is in
particular true if one can write, for every strategy u, as ξu,x;y(1/N,m,m
′).
with ξ defined on [0, 1]×∆×∆ and ξu,x;y is continuously differentiable.
Our model satisfies the assumptions in [5], therefore we have the following
result:
Theorem 3.1.1 ([5]). Assume that limN−→∞M
N (0) = ~m0 in probability.
For any stationary strategy u, and any time t, the random process MN(t) =
1
N
∑N
j=1 δXNj (t) converges in distribution to the (non-random) solution of the
ODE
~˙m(t) = f(u, ~m(t)) (3)
with initial condition ~m0.
3.2 Convergence results
We focus on one player, without loss of generality we can call her player 1,
and consider the process (XN1 ,M
N). For any finite N , XN1 and M
N are not
independent, however in the limit we have the following:
Theorem 3.2.1. Assume that limN−→∞M
N (0) = ~m0 and limN−→∞X
N
1 (0) =
x0 = (θ1, s0) in probability. The discrete time process (X
N
1 (t),M
N (t)) defined
for t ∈ NN , converges weakly to the continuous time jump and drift process
(X1(t), ~m(t)), where ~m(t) is solution of the ODE Equation (3) with initial con-
dition ~m0 and X1(t) is a continuous time, non homogeneous jump process, with
initial state x0. The rate of transition of X1(t) from state x1 = (θ1, s1) to state
x′1 = (θ1, s
′
1) is
A(x1, x
′
1; ~m(t), u) =
∑
k≥1
Jk(~m)Ak(s1, s
′
1; ~m(t), u)
with Ak(s1, s
′
1; ~m(t), u) =
∑
θ;s;a;s′
Lθ1,θ;s,s;a;s′,s′(k, ~m(t))
k∏
j=1
uθj(aj |sj)
k∏
j=2
mθj ,sj (t)
where θ = (θ2, ..., θk), s = (s2, ..., sk)
a = (a1, ..., ak), s
′ = (s′2, ..., s
′
k)
Note that, contrary to results based on propagation of chaos, we do not
assume that the distribution of player states at time 0 is exchangeable. In
contrast, we will use Theorem 3.2.1 precisely in the case where player 1 is
different from other players. Theorem 3.2.1 motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.3. To a game as defined in Section 2.1 we associate a “Macro-
scopic Mean Field Markov Game”, defined as follows. There is one player,
(player 1), with state X1(t) and a population profile ~m(t). The initial condition
of the game is X1(0) = x, ~m(0) = ~m0. The population profile is solution to the
ODE (3) and X1(t) evolves as a jump process Theorem 3.2.1.
Further, let r¯(u;x, ~m) be the discounted long-term payoff of player 1 in this
game, given that X1(0) = x and ~m(0) = ~m0, i.e. r¯(u;x, ~m) =
E
(∫ ∞
0
e−βtr(u,X1(t),m(t))|X1(0) = x, ~m(0) = ~m0
)
We also consider, as in Section 2.3, the case with Θ = 2 types and define by
analogy R(u1, u2; s, ~m) as the discounted long-term payoff when player 1 starts
in state s and the population profile starts in state ~m, with player 1 using strategy
u1 and other players strategy u2.
In order to exploit the convergence in distribution of the process focused
on one player, we need that the payoff be continuous in the topology of this
convergence. This is stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let E = S×∆ and DE [0,∞) the set of cadlag functions from
[0,∞) to R, equipped with Skorohod’s topology. The mapping
DE [0,∞) → R
(s,m) 7→
∫ ∞
0
e−βtr(u, s(t),m(t)) dt
is continuous.
Using Theorem 3.2.1 and Theorem 3.3.1 we obtain the following, which is
the main result of this paper. It says that when N goes to infinity, the Mean
Field Markov Game with N(t) of players becomes equivalent to the associated
Macroscopic Mean Field Markov Game. This reduces any multi-player problem
into an effective one-player problem facing an evolving aggregative object.
Theorem 3.3.2 (Asymptotically equivalent game). When N goes to infinity
we have (a) the discrete time process XN1 converges in distribution to the contin-
uous time process X1 (b) r¯
N (u;x, ~m) → r¯(u;x, ~m) and (c) RN (u1, u2; s, ~m) →
R(u1, u2; s, ~m)
3.4 Case with Global Attractor
Assume that, for some strategy u, the ODE (3) has a global attractor ~m∗ (this
may or may not hold, depending on the ODE). If in addition the model with
N players is irreducible, with stationary probability distribution ̟N for MN ,
then limN−→∞ ̟
N = δ~m∗ where δ~m∗ is the Dirac mass at ~m
∗ (follows from
[5]). i.e. the large time distribution of MN (t) converges, as N → ∞, to the
attractor ~m∗.
Also, (XNj (t),M
N (t)) converges to a continuous time, homogeneous Markov
jump process with time-independent transition matrix:
A(x1, x
′
1;u) =
∑
k≥1
Jk(~m)Ak(s1, s
′
1; ~m
∗, u)
Assume that the transition matrix A(x1, x
′
1;u) is also irreducible and let π()
be its unique stationary probability. Also let πN be the first marginal of the
stationary probability of (XN1 ,M
N ). It is natural in this case to replace the
definition of the long term payoffs RN (u1, u2; s, ~m) and R
N (u1, u2; s, ~m) by their
stationary counterparts
RNst(u1, u2) :=
∑
s
πN (s)RN (u1, u2; s, ~m
∗)
Rst(u1, u2) :=
∑
s
π(s)R(u1, u2; s, ~m
∗)
3.5 Single player per type selected per time slot
Consider the special case where at each time slot, only one player per type
between the N is randomly selected and has a chance to change its action, i.e.
♯BN = 1 w.p 1.
Thus H1 and H2 are automatically satisfied. The resulting ODE (see [6])
becomes
d
dt
mx(t) =
∑
x′
mx′Lx′,x(~m, u,Θ)−mx
∑
x′
Lx,x′(~m, u,Θ)
The term
∑
x′ mx′Lx′,x(~m, u,Θ) is the incoming flow in to x and the outgoing
flow from x is mx
∑
x′ Lx,x′(~m, u,Θ).
We then obtain a large class of state-dependent evolutionary game dynamics.
Note that in general the trajectories of the mean dynamics need not to converge.
In the case of single player selected in each time slot of 1/N and linear transition
in m, the time averages under the replicator dynamics converge its interior rest
points or the boundaries of the simplex.
3.6 Equilibrium and optimality
Let Us be the set of strategies. Consider the optimal control problems
(OPTN )
{
Maximize RN (u, u; s, ~m0)
s.t u ∈ Us
(OPT∞)
{
Maximize R(u, u; s, ~m0)
s.t u ∈ Us
The strategy u is an ǫ−optimal strategy for the N -optimal control problem if
RN (u, u; s, ~m0) ≥ −ǫ+ sup
v
RN (v, v; s, ~m0).
Also consider the fixed-point problems
(FIXN )
{
find u ∈ Us such that
u ∈ argmaxv∈Us{R
N (v, u; s, ~m0)}
(FIX∞)
{
find u ∈ Us such that
u ∈ argmaxv∈Us{R(v, u; s, ~m0)}
A solution to (FIXN ) or (FIX∞) is a ( Nash) equilibrium. We say that u is an
ǫ−equilibrium for the game with N [resp. N →∞] players if RN (u, u; s, ~m0) ≥
supv R
N (v, u; s, ~m0)− ǫ [resp. R(u, u; s, ~m0) ≥ supv R(v, u; s, ~m0)− ǫ].
Note that the definition of equilibrium and optimal strategy may depend on
the initial conditions. If, for any u ∈ Us, the hypotheses in Section 3.4 hold,
then we may relax this dependency.
Theorem 3.6.1 (Finite N). For every discount factor β > 0 the optimal con-
trol problem (OPTN ) (resp. the fixed-point problem (FIXN )) has at least one
0−optimal strategy (resp. 0−equilibrium). In particular, there a ǫN -optimal
strategy (resp. ǫN−equilibrium) with ǫN −→ 0.
Theorem 3.6.2 (Infinite N). Optimal strategies (resp. equilibrium strate-
gies) exist in the limiting regime when N → ∞ under uniform convergence
and continuity of RN → R. Moreover, if {UN} is a sequence of ǫN−optimal
strategies (resp. ǫN−equilibrium strategies) in the finite regime with ǫN −→ ǫ,
then, any limit of subsequence Uφ(N) −→ U is an ǫ− optimal strategy (resp.
ǫ−equilibrium) for game with infinite N.
3.7 Mean field equilibrium
Each generic player 1 with strategy v1 optimizes its own long-term payoff under
the behavior of its own-internal state which is a continuous time Markov jump
process driven by A(x1, x
′
1; v1, ~m(t), u) and the behavior of ~m(t) is given by the
controlled ODE under the strategy u.
It is important to notice that at the infinite population limit the mean field
limit dynamics does not depend on v1. This can be easily seen from the fact
that the effect of a single player is in order of 1N . When N −→ +∞, the effect
becomes negligible with the respect to the mass. However, v1 can be a big effect
in the rate transition of that player via A(x1, x
′
1; v1, ~m(t), u).
The consistency between the individual state transition and the fraction of
players per state needs to be checked.
We say that the pair (u∗t , ~m
∗(t)) is a mean field equilibrium if {u∗t}t≥0 is a
mean field response to the individual dynamic optimization where ~m∗(t) is the
mean field at time t and u∗t produces the mean field i.e ~m[u
∗, ~m0](t) = ~m
∗(t).
If (v∗, u∗,m∗) satisfies the following equation

βvθ,t(s,m) = sup
uθ
{
rθ(yθ, uθ, ~m(t))+
∑
s′
A(s, s′; ~m(t), u)vθ,t(s
′
θ, ~m(t))
}
+ f(u∗,m).∂mvθ,t
mθ(t) = mθ,0 +
∫ t
0
fθ(u
∗
t′ , ~m(t
′)) dt′
m(0) = m0 ∈ ∆(X ), θ ∈ Θ.
and the strategy
u∗θ,t ∈ argmax
{
rθ(yθ, uθ, ~m(t))+
∑
s′
A(s, s′; ~m(t), u)vθ,t(s
′
θ, ~m(t))
}
,
then, one gets a mean field equilibrium. The problem becomes maxv1∈Us{R(v1, u;x1, ~m0)}
subject to the transitions A(x1, x
′
1; v1, ~m(t), u) and the ODE.
4 Illustrating example
We present in this section an example of a dynamic version of the Hawk and
Dove problem where each individual has three energy levels. We derive the mean
field limit for the case where all users follow a given policy and where possibly
one player deviates. We then further simplify the model to only two energy
states per player. In that case we are able to fully identify and compute the
equilibrium in the limiting Mean Field Markov Game. Interestingly, we show
that the ODE converges to a fixed point which depends on the initial condition
and the policy.
Consider an homogenous population of N animals. An animal plays the role
of a player. Occasionally two animals find themselves in competition on the
same piece of food. Each animal has three states x = 0, 1, 2 which represents its
energy level. An animal can adopt an aggressive behavior (Hawk) or a peaceful
one (Dove, passive attitude). At the state x = 0 there is no action. We describe
the fitness of an animal (some arbitrary player) associated with the possible
outcomes of the meeting as a function of the decisions taken by each one of the
two animals. The fitnesses represent the following:
• An encounter Hawk-Dove or Dove-Hawk results in zero fitness to the Dove
and in v¯ of value for the Hawk that gets all the food without fight. The
state of the Hawk (the winner) is incremented a = 1{x′H=min(xH+1,2)} and
the state of the Dove is b = 1{x′D=max(xD−1,0)}.
• An encounter Dove-Dove results in a peaceful, equal-sharing of the food
which translates to a fitness of v¯2 to each animal and the state of each
animal change with the sum of the two distributions 12a+
1
2b
• An encounter Hawk-Hawk results in a fight in which with p = 1/2 chances,
one (resp. the other) animal obtains the food but also in which there is a
positive probability for each one of the animals to be wounded 1/2 . Then
the fitness of the animal 1 is 12 (v¯ − c) +
1
2 (−c) =
1
2 v¯ − c, where the −c
term represents the expected loss of fitness due to being injured.
i\j (gNi , g
N
j ) X
N
i (t+
1
N ), X
N
j (t+
1
N )
D −D ( v¯2 ,
v¯
2 )
1
2δmin(x1−1,0),max(x2+1,2)
+ 12δmax(x1+1,2),min(x2−1,0)
D −H (0, v) (min(x1 − 1, 0),max(x2 + 1, 2))
H −H 12v − c
1
2δmin(x1−1,0),max(x2+1,2)
+ 12δmax(x1+1,2),min(x2−1,0)
The vector of frequencies of states at time t is given byMNx (t) =
1
N
∑N
j=1 1{XNj (t)=x}
for x = 0, 1, 2 and the action set is Ax = {H,D} in each state x 6= 0, A0 = {}.
The assumptions in Section 3 are satisfied (pairwise interaction, ♯BN(t) = 2)
and the occupancy measure MN(t) converges to m(t).
4.1 ODE and Stationary strategies
Consider the following fixed parameters µ1 = L0,1, µ2 = L0,2. The population
profile is denoted by ~m = (m0,m1,m2) and the stationary strategy is described
by the parameters v1, v2 where v1 := u(H |1), v2 = u(H |2)
m˙2 = m0L0,2 +m1L1,2(u,m)−m2L2,1(u,m)
m˙1 = m0L0,1 +m2L2,1(u,m) −m1L1,2(u,m)−m1L1,0(u,m))
m˙0 = m1L10(u,m)− (µ1 + µ2)m0
where L12(u,m) =
m0 + v1
(v1m1
2
+ (1− v1)m1 +
v2m2
2
+ (1 − v2)m2
)
+(1− v1)
(
(1− v1)m1
2
+
(1 − v2)m2
2
)
L2,1(u,m) = v2
(v1m1
2
+
v2m2
2
)
+(1− v2)
(
(1− v1)m1
2
+ v2m2 +
(1 − v2)m2
2
)
L10(u,m) := v1
(v1m1
2
+
v2m2
2
)
+ (1− v1)
(
v1m1 +
(1 − v1)m1
2
+ v2m2 +
(1− v2)m2
2
)
,
For BN = {j1, j2}, x
′
j , xi ∈ {0, 1, 2},
d
dt
mx =
∑
x1,x2,x′2
mx1mx2Lx1,x2;x,x′2(u, ~m)
+
∑
x1,x2,x′1
mx1mx2Lx1,x2;x′1,x(u, ~m)
−mx
∑
x2,x′1,x
′
2
mx2Lx,x2;x′1,x′2(u, ~m)
−mx
∑
x1,x′1,x
′
2
mx1Lx1,x;x′1,x′2(u, ~m)
4.2 Computation of R(u1, u2; s, ~m).
We want to compute the value
V (u1, u2, x,m) := Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−βtr(u1, u2, x(t),m(t)) dt
s.t. m˙(t) = f(u2,m(t)),m(0) = m0, x(0) = x.
V (u1, u2, x,m) = Ex
∫ ∆
0
e−βtr(u1, u2, x(t),m(t)) dt
+Ex
∫ ∞
∆
e−βtr(u1, u2, x(t),m(t)) dt
= Ex
∫ ∆
0
e−βtr(u1, u2, x(t),m(t)) dt
+Exe
−β∆V (u1, u2, x(∆),m(∆))
This implies that
0 = Ex
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
e−βtr(u1, u2, x(t),m(t)) dt
+
e−β∆ − 1
∆
ExV (u1, u2, x(∆),m(∆))
+
ExV (u1, u2, x(∆),m(∆)) − V (u1, u2, x,m)
∆
(4)
Using Ito’s formula and Lebesgue integration properties, we obtain that: ExV (u1,u2,x(∆))−V (u1,u2,x)∆
goes to
∑
x′ Dmx′V (u1, u2, x
′) ddtmx′ + jumps, where Dmx′V is the derivative of
V in a weak sense, e
−β∆−1
∆ −→ −β, and the term
Ex
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
e−βtr(u1, u2, x(t),m(t)) dt −→ r(u1, u2, x,m0)
when ∆ goes to zero, and the jump term is due to the changes in the process x.
The jump term is explicitly determined by the transitions rates which contains
u1 and the value V as given section 3.7. Thus, we obtain
βV (u1, u2, x,m) = r(u1,x, u2,x, x,m) +
∑
x′
(Dmx′V (u1, u2, x
′,m))fx′(u2,m) + jumps (5)
where ui,x = ui(H |x).
The optimality is then given by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation ob-
tained by maximizing the right-hand side of the equation (5) over the action
set.
βΨ(x,m) = max
u1,x,u2,x
{r(u1,x, u2,x, x,m) +
∑
x′
(Dmx′Ψ(u1, u2, x
′,m))fx′(u2,m) + jumps}
and optimality conditions of the best response to u2 is given by
βΦ(u2, x) = max
a∈{H,D}
{r(a, u2,x, x,m) +
∑
x′
(Dmx′Φ(u2, x
′))fx′(u2,m) + jumps}
Note that in the global optimization case (under symmetry per class strategies)
we can drop the jump terms by computing the expected social welfare (which
do not depend on x but depends on m). Hence the equation reduces to a similar
one as in [2]. Now, if we consider the individual optimization problem, there is
a jump and drift term in the generator as it is usual in hybrid systems. Theses
equations are in general difficult to solve and the solutions are not necessarily
regular (e.g. viscosity solutions). Numerical approaches based on multi-grid
techniques of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Issacs equations can be found [8].
4.3 The case of two energy levels
In order to derive closed form expressions for solutions of our ODE, we consider
two states, i.e., each animal has two states x = 1, 2 which represents its energy
levels. Thus, the ODE can be expressed as follows:
m˙2(t) = (1−m2(t))L1,2(u,m)−m2(t)L2,1(u,m) (6)
which can be rewritten as
m˙2(t) = a1 + a2m2(t) + a3(m2(t))
2 (7)
with a1 = 1, a2 =
u2
2 − 2 < 0, a3 =
1−u2
2 > 0.
Let m[u,m0](t) be the solution of the ODE given u and a initial distribution
m(0) = m0. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1 u2 = 1 (fully aggressive when it is possible): the ODE becomes m˙2(t) =
1− 32m2(t) and the solution has the form
m2[1,m0](t) =
2
3
[1− c1e
− 3
2
t] (8)
with c1 = 1−
3
2m0 and m1[u,m0](t) = 1−m2[u,m0](t)
Case 2 u2 6= 1, (less aggressive in state 2)
m2[u,m0](t) = γ−(u) +
γ+(u)− γ−(u)
1− c2e(γ+(u)−γ−(u))a2t
(9)
where c2 = 1 +
γ+(u)− γ−(u)
m2(0)− γ−(u)
,
γ−(u) =
2− u2/2− (2 + u
2
2/4)
1
2
1− u2
< 1,
γ+(u) =
2− u2/2 + (2 + u
2
2/4)
1
2
1− u2
> 1
Note that in both cases there is a unique strategy-dependent global attractor.
lim
t−→∞
m2[u,m0](t) =
{
γ−(u) if u2 6= 1
2/3 if u2 = 1
The expected instant payoff of a player using the stationary strategy v when
the population profile is m[u,m0](t), is given by
r(v, u, 2,m[u,m0](t)) = v[v¯ − cm2u2] + (1− v)r(v, u, 1,m[u,m0](t))
r(v, u, 1,m[u,m0](t)) =
1
2
(1−m2[u,m0](t)u2)v¯
where m2[u,m0](t) is given by (8) (resp. (9)) for u2 = 1 (resp. u2 6= 1). Now,
we can compute explicitly the best response against u for a given initial m0.
Let
β2(u, 2,m0, t) = r(H,u, 2,m[u,m0](t)) − r(D, u, 2,m[u,m0](t)).
The best response, BR(x, u,m[u,m0](t)), against u at t is
BR(x, u,m[u,m0](t)) =
{
play Hawk if β2(u, x,m0, t) > 0
play Dove if β2(u, x,m0, t) < 0
This implies that it is better to play Hawk for v¯2c >
γ
1+γ where γ = max(2/3,m0).
Since the solution of the ODE is strictly monotone in time for each stationary
strategy, there is at most one time for which β2 is zero. It is easy to see that if
v¯
2c >
2
3 then the strategy which to play Hawk in state 2 and Dove in state 1 is
an equilibrium.
Figure 1: Global attractor for u2 = 1
Figure 2: Global attractor for u2 = 0.2
5 Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper has been to develop mean field asymptotic of interactions
with large number of players using stochastic games. Due to the curse of the size
of the population, the applicability of atomic stochastic games has been severely
limited. As an alternative, we proposed a method for mean field Markov games
where players make decisions only based on their own state and the global
system state. We have showed under mild assumptions convergence results,
where asymptotics were taken in the number of players. The population state
profile satisfies a system of non-linear ordinary differential equations. We have
considered very simple class of strategies that are functions only of player’s own
state and the population profile. We applied to Hawk-Dove interaction with
several energy level and formulated the ODEs. We show that the best response
depends on the initial conditions.
Appendix
Sketch of proof of Proposition 2.2.1
Let τN be the first time after t = 0 that XNj (t) hits in some given state. We
show that
r¯N =
1
N
E
τN∑
s=0 step 1/N
e−βtrN
(
XNj (s),M
N (s)
)
(10)
Define for t ∈ N/N :
ZNt =
t∑
s=0 step 1/N
e−βs
(
GN (s)− rN
(
XNj (s),M
N (s)
))
we have, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t:
Q := E
(
ZNt − Z
N
s |F
N
s
)
=
t∑
u′=0
step 1/N
e−βu
′
E
(
GN (u′)− rN
(
XNj (u
′),MN (u′)
)
|FNs
)
which can be written as
t∑
u′=0
step 1/N
e−βu
′
E
(
E
(
GN (u′)− rN
(
XNj (u
′),MN (u′)
)
|FNu′
)
|FNs
)
= 0
thus ZNt is an F
N
t − martingale. Now τ
N is a stopping time with respect to the
filtration FNt thus, by Doob’s stopping time theorem: EZ
N
t∧τN = EZ
N
0∧τN = 0
Further, ZNt∧τN ≤ K|τ
N | for some constant K. Since τN is almost surely finite
and has a finite expectation, we can apply dominated convergence (with t→∞)
and obtain EZNτN = 0.
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 3.2.1
To prove the weak convergence of ZN , we check the following steps: Without
loss of generality, we took the set of states as S = {0, 1, 2, . . . , ♯S} XNj has a
jump r with probability
qNi,i+r(M
N (k)) =
1
N
LNi,i+r(M
N (k), u))
and MN is the continuous process with drift fN .
• We introduce of X˜Nj by scaling with step size
1
N . Then, Z
N = (XN ,MN )
is approximate in some sense by a discrete time process Z˜N = (X˜N , m˜N )
where m˜N(k) = m(⌊Nt⌋) m solution of the ODE with X˜Nj is the discrete
time jump process with transition matrix
qNi,i+r(m˜
N (k)) =
1
N
LNi,i+r(m(
k
N
), u)).
We show that d(XNj , X˜
N
j ) −→ 0 for any compact of time intervals.
•
Z˜N = (X˜N , m˜N ) =⇒ (X˜, m˜)
MN ([Nt]) −→ m(t). We derive the weak convergence of ZN to (X,m)
where m is deterministic and X is random.
Approximation by a discrete time process
The following lemma follows from the lemma 1 and 3 in Benaim and Weibull
(2003,2008), in which we incorporate behaviorial strategies.
Lemma 5.0.1. For every t > 0 there exists a constant c such that for every
ǫ > 0 and N large enough one has
P ( sup
0≤τ≤T
||MN (τ)−m(τ)|| > ǫ| MN(0) = m0, u) ≤ 2(♯S)e
−ǫ2CN
for all m0 ∈ ∆d, all every stationary strategy u.
Since C is independent of N, and (e−ǫ
2C)N is summable, we can use the
dominated convergence theorem: for all ǫ > 0,
∑
N
P
(
sup0≤τ≤T ‖M
N(τ) −m(τ) ‖∞> ǫ| M
N (0) = m0, u
)
<∞,
By Borel-Cantelli’s lemma, for every fixed t <∞, the random variable νN,t :=
sup0≤τ≤t ‖M
N(τ)−m(τ) ‖∞ converges almost completely towards 0. This ν
N,t
implies that converges almost surely to 0.
We introduce of X˜Nj by scaling with step size
1
N . Then, Z
N = (XN ,MN) is
approximate in some sense by a discrete time process Z˜N = (X˜N , m˜N ) where
m˜N (k) = m(⌊Nt⌋) m solution of the ODE where X˜Nj is the discrete time jump
process with transition matrix
qNi,i+r(m˜
N (k)) =
1
N
Li,i+r(m(
k
N
), u)).
Using the lemma 5.0.1 and uniform Lipschitz continuity of of LN , we obtain
that
sup
i,j
sup
0≤τ≤t
‖ qNi,j(M
N (τ)) − qi,j(m(τ)) ‖
≤ K(ǫN + sup
0≤τ≤t
‖MN(τ) −m(τ)‖).
Hence, we can write ‖MN(τ) −m(τ)‖ ≤ K(ǫN +
1
N2 ) over set of event Ωǫ =
{‖MN(τ) −m(τ)‖ ≤ ǫ} and P (Ωǫ) ≥ 1− 2(♯S)e
−ǫ2CN → 1. Thus,
P (XNj,|[0,t] = X˜
N
j,|[0,t]|k transitions) ≥ E(ǫ
Bin( 1N ,Nt))
E(ǫBin(
1
N ,Nt)) = (1−
1
N
+
1
N
ǫ)Nt
P (XNj,|[0,t] = X˜
N
j,|[0,t]|k transitions) ≥ e
ǫ
and this holds for any ǫ arbitrary small. We define d(X,Y ) =
∑
k=0
1
2k
d(Xk, Yk)
where d(Xk, Yk) = 1Xk 6=Yk . Then, d(X
N
j,|[0,t], X˜
N
j,|[0,t]) −→ 0 when N goes to
infinity.
Convergence of the discrete time process To prove the weak convergence
of (X˜Nj , M˜
N), we check the following steps:
• the discrete time empirical measures M˜N are tight (follows from Sznitman
for finite states) and converges to a martingale problem. The limit m˜
is deterministic measure and is solution of ODE which has the unique
solution m (given m0, u). Thus, m˜ = m.
• Conditionally to M˜N , X˜Nj converges to a martingale problem. The jump
and drift process X˜ with time dependent transition is given by the limit of
the marginal of AN (.|M˜N ,m0, x0, u). We derive the weak convergence of
(X˜Nj , M˜
N) to (X˜, m˜) where m˜ is deterministic and X˜ is random. For this
we use the Theorem 17.25 and its discrete time approximation in Theorem
17.28 pages 344-347 in Kallenberg.
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Since Skorohod’s topology is induced by a metric, it is sufficient to show that
whenever (XNj ,m
N )→ (x,m) in Skorohod’s topology, we have:
lim
N−→∞
∫ ∞
0
e−βtrN (v,XNj (t),m
N (t))dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−βtr(v, x(t),m(t))dt
By [7], page 117, there is some sequence of increasing bijections λn: [0,∞)→
[0,∞) s.t.
λn(t)− λn(s)
t− s
→ 1 uniformly in t and s
and ‖ yn(t)− y(λn(t)) ‖→ 0 uniformly in t
over compact subsets of [0,∞). Fix ǫ > 0, arbitrary and consider
hN := |
∫ ∞
0
e−βtrN (XN(t), v,mN (t))dt
−
∫ ∞
0
e−βtr(x(t), v,m(t))dt|
≤
∫ ∞
0
e−βt|rN (xN (t), v,mN (t))− r(x(t), v,m(t))|dt
First let K = supx∈S,v,m∈∆ |r(x, v,m)| < ∞ by hypothesis, and pick some
time T large enough such that e−βTK/β ≤ ǫ/3. Thus
hN ≤ ǫ/3 +
∫ T
0
e−βt|r(xN (t), v,mN (t)) − r(x(t), v,m(t))|dt (11)
Second, we use the distance on E defined by
d((x,m), (x′,m′)) =‖ m−m′ ‖ +1x 6=x′ (12)
Let K ′ = sup
x∈S,v,m∈∆d
|r(x, v,m) − r(x′, v,m′)|
‖ m−m′ ‖
<∞
by hypothesis. It is easy to see that for all x, x′ ∈ S and m,m′ ∈ ∆d:
‖ r(x, v, ,m) − r(x′, v,m′) ‖≤ K ′d((x,m), (x′,m′)) (13)
Thus, by Equation (11):
hN ≤ ǫ/3 +K ′
∫ T
0
e−βtd
(
(xN (t),mN (t)), (x(t),m(t))
)
dt (14)
By [7], page 117, there is some sequence of increasing bijections λN : [0,∞)→
[0,∞) s.t.
λN (t)− λN (s)
t− s
→ 1 uniformly in t and s
and d
(
(xN (t),mN (t), (xN (λN (t)),mN (λN (t)))
)
→ 0
uniformly in t over compact subsets of [0,∞). Thus there is some N0 ∈ N such
that for N ≥ N0 and t ∈ [0, T ]:
d
(
(xN (t),mN (t), (xN (λN (t)),mN (λN (t)))
)
≤
ǫβeβT
3K ′
(15)
Thus, by the triangular inequality for d: hN ≤
≤
ǫ
3
+K ′
∫ T
0
e−βtd
(
(xN (t)mN (t)), (x(λN (t)),m(λN (t))
)
dt
+K ′
∫ T
0
e−βtd
(
(x(λN (t)),m(λN (t))), (x(t),m(t)
)
dt
≤
2ǫ
3
+K ′
∫ T
0
e−βtd
(
(x(λN (t)),m(λN (t))), (x(t),m(t))
)
dt (16)
Third, let D be the set of discontinuity points of (x,m). Since (x,m) is
cadlag, D is enumerable, thus it is negligible for the Lebesgue measure and
∫ T
0
e−βtd
(
(x(λN (t)), a,m(λN (t))), (x(t), a,m(t)
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
e−βtd
(
(x(λN (t)),m(λN (t))), (x(t),m(t)
)
1t/∈Ddt
Now limN−→∞ λ
N (t) = t and thus for t /∈ D
lim
N−→∞
d
(
(x(λN (t)),m(λN (t))), (x(t),m(t)
)
= 0
and thus by dominated convergence
lim
N−→∞
∫ T
0
e−βtd
(
(x(λN (t)),m(λN (t))), (x(t),m(t))
)
dt = 0 (17)
and for N large enough the second term in the right-hand side of Equation (16)
can be made smaller than ǫ/3. Finally, for N large enough, hN ≤ ǫ. This
completes the proof.
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
Define the discounted stochastic evolutionary game with random number of
interacting players in each local interaction in which each player in x with the
mixed action u(.|x) receives r(u, x,m(t)) where m(t) is the population profile
at t, which evolves under the dynamical system (3) and the between states
follows the transition kernel L. Then, a strategy of a player is the same as in
the microscopic case and the discounted payoffs
R(u1, u2, s0,m0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−βtr(s(t), u1,m[u2](t))dt
is the limit of RN (u1, u2, s0,m0) when N goes to infinity, where m[u2] is the
solution of the ODE m˙ = f(u2,m),m(0) = m0 . It follows that the asymptotic
regime of the microscopic game and the Markov decision evolutionary game
(macroscopic game) are equivalent.
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 3.6.1
We show that for every discount factor β > 0 the optimal control problem
(OPTN ) (resp. the fixed-point problem (FIXN )) has at least one 0−optimal
strategy. It follows from the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies for
finite stochastic games with discounted payoff: The set of pure strategies is a
compact space in the product topology (Tykhonov theorem). Thus, the set
of behavioral strategies Σj is a compact space and also convex as the set of
probabilities on the pure strategies. For every player j and every strategy profile
σ the marginal of the payoffs and constraints functions are continuous for any
β > 0 : αj 7−→ R
N
j (αj , σ−j , s,m0).Moreover, the stationary strategies is convex,
compact and upper and lower hemi-continuous (as a correspondence). Define
γj(s,m0, σ) = arg max
αj∈Us
RNj (αj , σ−j , s,m0).
Then, γj(m0, σ) ⊆ Σj is a non-empty, convex and compact set and the product
correspondence
γ : σ 7−→ (γ1(s,m0, σ), . . . , γN (s,m0, σ))
is upper hemi-continuous (its graph is closed). We now use the Glicksberg gen-
eralization of Kakutani fixed point theorem, and there is a stationary strategy
profile σ∗ such that
σ∗ ∈ γ(s,m0, σ
∗).
Moreover, if the game has symmetric payoffs and strategies for each type, there
is a symmetric per type stationary equilibrium. This completes the proof.
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 3.6.2
Let (UN )N be a sequence of solution of (FIXN ) i.e equilibrium in the system
with N players. Choose a subsequence Nk such that U
Nk converges to some
point u when k goes to infinity. We can write
RNk(UNk , UNk)−R(U,U) = RNk(UNk , UNk)−RNk(U,U)+RNk(U,U)−R(U,U).
Since RN(., .) is continuous and converges uniformly to R(., .), RNk converges
uniformly to R, the second termRNk(U,U)−R(U,U) −→ 0 whenNk −→∞ and
the first termRNk(UNk , UNk)−RNk(U,U) can be rewritten asRNk(UNk , UNk)−
RNk(U,U) = RNk(UNk , UNk)−R(UNk , UNk)+R(UNk , UNk)−R(U,U)+R(U,U)−
RNk(U,U). Each term goes to zero by continuity of R, convergence of UNk to U,
and by uniform convergence of RN to R. Let UN be a ǫN−equilibrium. Then,
RN(UN , UN ) ≥ RN (v, UN )− ǫN , ∀v. Then any limit U of a subsequence of U
N
satisfies R(U,U) ≥ R(v, U)− ǫ, ∀v. Similarly, if
RN (UN , UN ) ≥ RN(v, v) − ǫN , ∀v
then any omega-limit U of the sequence of UN satisfies R(U,U) ≥ R(v, v) −
ǫ, ∀v i.e U is an ǫ−optimal strategy. In particular if (UN )N is a sequence of
ǫN−equilibria (resp. optimal strategies) with ǫN −→ 0 when N goes to infinity
then any accumulation point U of (UN )N is a 0−equilibrium (resp. 0−optimal
strategy).
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